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I. INTRODUCTION 
Copyright represents more than one type of exclusive right. It 
actually consists of a bundle of different exclusive rights. For 
example, in the United States, copyright includes rights of 
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, display, and 
digital sound recording transmission rights.1 In the United Kingdom, 
copyright consists of rights of reproduction, adaption, 
communication to the public, performance, and broadcasting.2 These 
rights have developed in a disconnected and fragmented way because 
of the expansion of copyright owners’ control in response to 
technological change.3 Each of these sub-rights can be owned, 
transacted, and enforced separately.4
 
This is called copyright 
divisibility.5 Copyright divisibility enables separate ownership 
 
 1.  17 U.S.C. §106 (2016). 
 2.  See Copyright, Designs, Patents Act 1988, c. 2, §§ 16-23 (UK) [hereinafter 
CDPA]. 
 3.  E.g., LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
136 (3d ed. 2009) (“[r]ights have developed in a piecemeal way in response to 
external pressures: notably to technological change.”); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN 
& BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND 
PRACTICE 298 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that rights have expanded “[t]o bring new 
technological uses of literary and artistic works within copyright control.”). 
 4.  See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2012) (“Any of the exclusive rights comprised 
in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 
106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The 
owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all 
of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.”); 
CDPA, c. 5, §90(2)(a) (“An assignment or other transmission of a copyright may 
be . . . limited so as to apply to one or more, but not all, of the things the copyright 
owner has the exclusive right to do.”). 
 5.  See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 363-64 (4th ed. 
2000) (clarifying the conceptual importance of divisibility); see also Jessica 
Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20 (2010) [hereinafter 
Litman, Copyright Reform] (noting the divisibility of exclusive rights complicates 
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interests in different subsets of the exclusive rights to a single work.6 
It is quite common for authors to transfer or license each of these 
sub-rights to different parties.7 For example, if I write a novel. I can 
carve my right by granting Teresa the right to publish the novel; 
grating Elena the right to produce a motion picture based on my 
novel; and granting Lawrence the right to produce an audio book of 
my novel. All these rights can be granted simultaneously and 
independently. 
Copyright divisibility has great virtue. As not all copyright holders 
are in the position to maximize the value of various uses of their 
works, copyright divisibility enables them to enlist the assistance of 
others in multiple markets.8 However, these exclusive rights 
sometimes overlap with eachother;9 therefore, the same act may 
infringe different exclusive rights simultaneously.10 Divisibility and 
overlapping exclusive rights thus have created enormous 
transactional costs for copyright clearance.11 Users may never 
understand that they may infringe copyright even though they 
 
copyright licensing); Jeffrey W. Natke, Collapsing Copyright Divisibility: A 
Proposal for Situational or Medium Specific Indivisibility, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
483, 486, 495-96 (2007) (asserting that copyright in cyberspace is further 
complicated by divisibility); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping 
Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 570 (1997). 
 6.  See Litman, Copyright Reform, supra note 5, at 20 (discussing the 
practical implications of divisibility on the ownership of individual exclusive 
rights). 
 7.  See Ariel Katz, Copyright Collectives: Good Solution But for Which 
Problem?, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 395, 395 (Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Katz, Copyright Collectives] (noting that 
collective administration of individual copyright rights is common practice). 
 8.  See discussion infra Section II.A (discussing the longstanding 
establishment of divisibility as a legal concept within real property ownership). 
 9.  See, e.g., BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 136 (noting that the 
copyright system has developed in a cumulative, reactionary way, producing rights 
with a degree of similarity, or overlap, between them); see also Tilman Lüder, The 
Next Ten Years in E.U. Copyright: Making Markets Work, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 26 (2007) (identifying criticism of European efforts to 
harmonize copyright, which has complicated overlapping rights). 
 10.  Cf., MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 294 (4th 
ed. 2005) (subdividing rights within a given work grants each transferee standing 
to sue infringers of that right). 
 11.  See ROBERT A. GORMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 345-
46 (8th ed., 2011) (highlighting the potential difficulty in identifying the owner of 
a given right in order to obtain a license). 
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already secure licenses from one of the right holders. Because of 
copyright divisibility and overlapping exclusive rights, users often 
need to identify, negotiate with, and obtain permissions from 
different parties that own different sub-rights even for a single use of 
only one copyrighted work.12 Any of the right holders can veto a 
single use of the subject copyrighted work. This is one example of 
how copyright rules have become too complicated and arcane for the 
general public to understand.13 
Digital technologies and the Internet, however, have not 
ameliorated the problem, but instead made it more perplexing.14 
Compared to activities in the physical world, those in cyberspace are 
more often associated with different overlapping exclusive rights.15 
According to international treaties, such as the World Intellectual 
Property (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, copyright in the digital 
environment occasionally involves three types of exclusive economic 
rights:16 the right of reproduction,17 the right of communication to the 
 
 12.  See id. at 346 (providing the example of works published online, which 
implicate multiple divisible rights, and therefore require a license from each 
individual owner). 
 13.  See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 18 (2001) [hereinafter 
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT] (explaining that copyright developed largely to 
counter corporate or institutional infringement, so the structure of statutory 
protections is more complex than what may be generally understood by the 
public). 
 14.  See, e.g., Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: 
Rethinking the Collective Administration of Performing Rights, 1 J. COMPETITION 
L. & ECON. 541, 561 n.83 (2005) [hereinafter Katz, Rethinking the Collective 
Administration] (“When it comes to the Internet the problem . . . [it] becomes more 
complicated because a single online transmission of a work may involve different 
overlapping copyrights.”); see also Natke, supra note 5, at 486 (“A single activity 
in cyberspace often implicates several exclusive rights and copyright owners’ 
interests.”); Lemley, supra note 5, at 573-74 (“The unique problem posed by the 
Net is that it does not merely constitute a new medium for reproduction, 
distribution, or performance, but rather a medium which blends each of those 
exclusive rights in an unanticipated way.”). 
 15.  See Katz, Rethinking the Collective Administration, supra note 14 and 
accompanying text, at 561 n.83. 
 16.  Lüder, supra note 9, at 14 (discussing potential territoriality issues inherent 
in the three “online” rights). 
 17.  See WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 
(1997) [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty] (incorporating by reference the 
reproduction right codified in Annex I article 9 of the Berne Convention); WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty arts. 7, 11, 16, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 
I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Performances and Phonograms] (establishing 
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public,18 and the right of making the product available online.19 New 
business models enabled by digital technologies, such as 
International Protocol Television (IPTV), music streaming, and other 
web-based content delivery services have led to copyright 
controversies, mostly over which type of copyright is involved in a 
certain transaction. These different rights may be owned by different 
right holders or administered by different copyright management 
organizations (CMOs).20 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides an overview of 
the problems stemming from copyright divisibility and the theory of 
the anticommons. The fragmented copyright has led to significant 
uncertainties for users and huge transactional costs for the 
exploitation, dissemination, and enforcement of copyright. The 
problem stemming from copyright divisibility mirrors the tragedy of 
the anticommons defined by Michael Heller, when he observed the 
underuse of property and resulting inefficiency in the post-
communist Russian economy. This Article uses anticommons theory 
as a lens to analyze copyright divisibility, its consequential costs on 
users and the society, and possible policy solutions. Part III 
introduces judicial approaches to overlapping copyright rights in the 
United Kingdom, China, Germany, and the United States. The legal 
treatment of users’ costs in obtaining multiple licenses varies 
significantly in different jurisdictions. Part IV examines three 
possible solutions to the fragmented copyright and overlapping 
exclusive rights. These proposals include consolidating existing 
bundles of exclusive rights and adopting an implied license doctrine 
 
the scope and limitations of the reproduction right, which contracting parties must 
codify in national legislation); see also Directive 2001/29, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, art. 2, on the Harmonisation of 
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society 2001 
O.J. (L 167). 
 18.  E.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 17, art. 8; see also Directive 
2001/29, supra note 17, art. 3. 
 19.  See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 17, art. 8 (making available to the 
public “by wire or wireless means”); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 
supra note 18, arts. 10, 14, and 16 (making fixed performances and phonographs 
publically available “by wire or wireless means”); see also Directive 2001/29, 
supra note 17, art. 3(2) (making available such that a member of the public may 
access “from a place and at a time individually chosen by them”). 
 20.  See Directive 2001/29, supra note 17, art. 7 (outlining obligations 
concerning rights-management information). 
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for the incidental use of copyrighted work based on one single 
exclusive right. This Article also assesses whether a more 
streamlined collective copyright management mechanism can 
decrease the costs brought by copyright divisibility. These proposals 
are not exclusive to each other. Each of them has its strength and 
weakness, and anticommons theory provides an effective lens to 
evaluate these possible solutions. Part V concludes that based on the 
anticommons theory and the line of relevant research, the law should 
at its best avoid creating new type of sub-right; whereas the court 
ought to consider developing doctrines reducing users’ costs in 
acquiring license for a single use of copyrighted work. 
II. FRAGMENTED COPYRIGHT AND THE 
ANTICOMMONS 
By increasing the number of potential right holders, copyright 
divisibility requires users to obtain multiple licenses for any single 
use of a copyrighted work.21 Although divisibility may help 
copyright owners maximize copyright revenue, it may also lead to 
the tragedy of the anticommons. This section illustrates the multitude 
of rights and rights holders brought by divisibility, and then links 
divisibility and the social costs it brought to the anticommons 
scenario. 
A. THE MULTITUDE OF RIGHTS AND RIGHT HOLDERS 
Copyright involves a collection of exclusive rights in relation to 
creative works.22 Different exclusive rights have been designed to 
cover new technological use.23 Each sub-right underlying a 
copyrighted work can be transferred or licensed to different parties.24
 
Put differently, the ownership of interest over the same object may 
 
 21.  See e.g.,  id. (“[T]he problem with divisibility is that it potentially requires 
multiple licenses for any single use . . . while simultaneously making it very 
difficult to tell who owns the rights one needs to license.”). 
 22.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (specifying the exclusive rights of copyright owners). 
 23.  See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG 
TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 188-89 (rev. ed. 2003) (calling for legislatures to be 
quick in extending copyright protections to new technological uses of otherwise 
protected works). 
 24.  E.g., Daniel Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright: Theory and 
Practice in the Digital Age, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND 
RELATED RIGHTS 1, 10 (2010) [hereinafter Gervais, Collective Management]. 
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be divided up and owned by different entities.25 This is the doctrine 
of copyright divisibility, which was once recognized by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.26 Divisibility is also a long established doctrine in 
land law.27 For example, a landowner can transfer easement and 
profit à prendre to different parties.28 The benefit of copyright 
divisibility is that authors can exploit their works in different ways or 
even in multiple markets.29 
Divisibility aims to enable copyright owners to fully capture the 
value of copyrighted work with the help of others.30 It provides 
copyright holders with more economic autonomy.31 In order to 
maximize profit, rights holders may license different rights to 
different CMOs whose businesses are designed to manage specific 
exclusive rights.32 Therefore, even when there is only one author 
 
 25.  See, e.g., Christopher M. Newman, A License is Not a “Contract Not to 
Sue”: Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 
IOWA L. REV. 1101, 1123 (2013) (clarifying that different uses of a given work 
may be divided and owned separately) [hereinafter Newman, A License is Not a 
“Contract Not to Sue”]; Christopher M. Newman, An Exclusive License is Not an 
Assignment: Disentangling Divisibility and Transferability of Ownership in 
Copyright, 74 LA. L. REV. 59, 61 (2013) [hereinafter, Newman, An Exclusive 
License] (noting that divisibility allows subset of rights to be assigned separately). 
 26.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495-96 (2001) (acknowledging 
that the copyright is a “bundle of discrete ‘exclusive rights’ . . . each of which may 
be and owned separately”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Newman, A License is Not a “Contract Not to Sue,” supra note 
25, at 1124 (“[p]roperty law empowers titleholders to create license privileges in 
others.”); see also Newman, An Exclusive License, supra note 25, at 83-89 
(discussing the established concepts of severability and transfer of subsets of real 
property rights). 
 28.  Newman, A License is Not a “Contract Not to Sue,” supra note 25, at 
1123-24 (clarifying that easements and profits-à-prendre represent “irrevocable 
privileges” in real property law). 
 29.  See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 1, 18 (2004) (“[divisibility is] the biggest reason that authors don’t need to 
sign over their copyrights when they publish things. It allows the author to keep 
control over different sorts of exploitation of her work by different entities.”). 
 30.  E.g., Newman, An Exclusive License, supra note 25, at 81-82 (analogizing 
the divisibility of copyrighted work to the divisibility of real property, where 
individual title owners are not always best positioned “[t]o engage in all the 
highest-value uses of their property without enlisting the assistance of others”). 
 31.  GORMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 345. 
 32.  See Natke, supra note 5, at 497; cf., Poorna Mysoor, Unpacking the Right 
of Communication to the Public: A Closer Look at International and EU Copyright 
Law, INTELL. PROP. Q. 166, 183-84 (2013) (arguing that assigning overlapping 
rights to multiple licensees negatively impacts the ability of the copyright owner to 
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holding copyright over a work, he may still be represented by 
different copyright collecting societies for different types of rights.33 
In practice, it is quite possible that unrelated parties own or are 
licensed with different exclusive rights to the same copyrighted 
work.34 Moreover, all these subdivisions may be co-owned by co-
authors or their successors.35 Co-ownership and inheritance certainly 
increase the transaction costs for copyright clearance. 
Sometimes there are multiple copyrighted works on one single 
subject.36  For example, a film contains a bundle of screenplays, 
characters, music, and other copyrighted works.37 Producers, 
directors, and actors in some jurisdictions can claim their rights 
independently in the same film.38 A pop song may include different 
copyrighted works owned by respective copyright holders, such as 
 
maximize the benefits of the sub-divided rights). 
 33.  See Daniel Gervais & Alana Maurushat, Fragmented Copyright, 
Fragmented Management: Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management, 2 CAN. J. 
L. & TECH. 15, 22 (2003) (providing the example of producing and distributing a 
film, noting the complexity of rights and potential roles for collective management 
organizations relating to each). 
 34.  See Lemley, supra note 5, at 570. 
 35.  See Gervais, Collective Management, supra note 24, at 2; see also, 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 
1015, 1043 (2015) (discussing that rights fragment over time; for example, where a 
single right owner’s heirs mutually inherit that right); Katz, Rethinking the 
Collective Administration, supra note 14, at 560 (providing an example of 
copyright fragmentation in the music industry). 
 36.  See Gervais & Maurushat, supra note 33, at 15, 20 (“[m]ultimedia work is 
subdivided into the various components such as a sound, an image, a photograph, 
or software program.”). 
 37.  E.g., Gervais, Collective Management, supra note 24, at 13. 
 38.  See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, Electronic Rights Management Systems, 3 J. 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 77, 81 (2000) (discussing the complexity of copyright 
management for a motion picture or play, where various rights holders, such as 
authors, publishers, performers, and producers are involved and entitled to 
royalties); see Guy Pessach, The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances—
The Return of the North?, 55 IDEA 79, 86-89 (2014); Gervais & Maurushat, supra 
note 33, at 21 (discussing musical works within a motion picture, where each 
composer and producer within that movie may be entitled to royalties for their 
work). Some commentators argue that by enabling each contracting country to 
decide upon the relationship between audiovisual performers and film producers, 
article 12 of the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances actually weakens the 
protection for performers, who are principally in an inferior bargaining position. 
Similar criticisms are made on the “statutory presumptions,” a proposal that 
copyrights are systematically transferred to corporate entities; see also Lüder, 
supra note 9, at 26-27. 
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producers, composers, lyricists, performers, and publishers.39 
Therefore, a single use of a song requires separate licenses from 
different right holders and CMOs, such as an author’s society, a 
producer’s society, and a performer’s society.40 Copyright clearance 
on occasion becomes challenging when rights holders, such as 
producers/performers41 and composers/publishers,42 may have 
different views regarding how the subject work should be exploited. 
Digital technologies, however, have made copyright fragmentation 
more common and legally confusing.43 One example is the Internet 
 
 39.  See, e.g., Katz, Copyright Collectives, supra note 7, at 402; Gervais, 
Collective Management, supra note 24, at 10, 12 (charting the rights and rights 
holders in an “internet communication of a sound recording containing a 
performance of a protected musical work”); Lüder, supra note 9, at 23-24, 41 
(“There are many right-holders—e.g., authors, composers, publishers, record 
producers and performers—and rights—e.g. communication to the public, 
reproduction and ‘making available’—that are involved in a single transaction 
involving the electronic provision of music.”); see also WILLIAM W. FISHER III, 
PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 59-
67 (2004) (describing the bundle of rights and different rights holders underlying a 
film); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 35, at 1045 (noting that copyright protects 
various component elements, as well as the combined film, as a combined product 
as a wholeof multiple contributions); Katz, Rethinking the Collective 
Administration, supra note 14, at 560 (noting that “[a] single song essentially 
comprises two separate protected works, its composition and its lyrics”). 
 40.  See, e.g., Lüder, supra note 9, at 23-24 (clarifying the distinction between 
authors’ rights and rights of performers and record producers); see also FISHER, 
supra note 39, at 46-59 (describing the bundle of rights and different rights holders 
underlying music). 
 41.  See, e.g., Séverine Dusollier & Caroline Colin, Peer-to-Peer and 
Copyright: What Could Be the Role of Collective Management?, 34 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 809, 834 (2011) (“[p]roducers, who prioritize protecting their markets, may 
seek to hault unauthorized [peer-to-peer] transfers entirely, while performers may 
prefer compensation from exploitations bound to happen anyway.”); Els 
Vanheusden, Performers’ Rights in European Legislation: Situation and Elements 
for Improvement, AEPO-ARTIS 47 (2007), http://www.aepo-artis.org/usr/aepo-
artis%20 studies/study%20performers%20rights%20in%20acquis_aepo-artis.pdf  
(discussing royalties and remuneration interests of performers). 
 42.  See generally Bruce A. Lehman, Intellectual Property and the National 
Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual 
Property Rights, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE 222 (Sep. 1995), 
https://www.uspto. gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf (identifying a 
disconnect in the interests of performers and composers for public performances of 
musical compositions). 
 43.  See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1917 
(2007) [hereinafter Litman, Lawful Personal Use]; Natke, supra note 5, at 495-98 
(suggesting that overlapping rights can needlessly complicate online copyright 
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transmission of music in the United States, which involves both 
license for public performance and license for distribution. However, 
the former is administered by the American Society of Composers, 
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), 
whereas the latter is licensed by the Harry Fox Agency (HFA), a 
subsidiary of the National Music Publishers Association.44 At times 
the reproduction and distribution rights are controlled by the music 
publishers themselves.45 In other jurisdictions, similar problems exist 
where the right of reproduction and right of making available to the 
public.46 The sharing of unauthorized content online infringes these 
two rights simultaneously.47 In some jurisdictions, these rights are 
administered by one single CMO; whereas in others, they are 
managed by different entities.48 
As Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman pointed out: “[f]rom 
an efficiency point of view, the objective in choosing a property 
rights regime should be to maximize the aggregate value of assets to 
rights holders less the aggregate user, nonuser, and system costs 
induced by the rights regime.”49 Therefore, when evaluating the 
 
enforcement); see also Jonah M. Knobler, Performance Anxiety: The Internet and 
Copyright’s Vanishing Performance/Distribution Distinction, 25 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L. J. 531, 533 (2007) (questioning the distinction between reproduction, 
distribution, and performance rights on the Internet). 
 44.  See Lehman, supra note 42, at 213-225; see also Joshua Keesan, Let It Be? 
The Challenges of Using Old Definitions for Online Music Practices, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 353, 356 (2008); Knobler, supra note 43, at 542 (describing 
the disaggregation of copyright interests as applied to transmission of music on the 
internet); Michael A. Einhorn & Lewis Kurlantzick, Traffic Jam on the Music 
Highway: Is it a Reproduction or a Performance?, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
417, 421-22 (2001). 
 45.  See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC 
BUSINESS 206-38 (5th ed. 2003); Natke, supra note 5, at 495; see also Lemley, 
supra note 5, at 571 (“ASCAP licenses only performance rights, and the CCC 
[Copyright Clearance Center] only reproduction rights.”). 
 46.  See infra Part III.B (addressing the problem of overlapping rights as it 
pertains to making copyrighted works available to the public). 
 47.  See Lüder, supra note 9, at 26 (illustrating that a music downloading 
service would need to license both the reproduction right and the “making 
available” right). 
 48.  See Lüder, supra note 9, at 24-25; Gervais & Maurushat, supra note 33, at 
21; see also Litman, Copyright Reform, supra note 5, at 42 (“[i]t has become 
conventional for different copyright rights to be separately controlled by different 
intermediaries.”). 
 49.  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and 
LEE; COPYRIGHT DIVISIBILITY AND THE ANTICOMMONS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016  3:22 PM 
2016] THE ANTICOMMONS 127 
benefit brought by copyright divisibility, it is equally important to 
assess the resultant costs. From a user’s perspective, if overlapping 
rights are administered by different CMOs, the costs of right 
clearance may increase significantly. Users need to identify who the 
right holders are and negotiate with them separately.50 The 
transaction costs stemming from searching and negotiation are 
significant,51 which may be higher than the value of a user’s 
activity.52 
B. THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS 
The theory of the tragedy of the anticommons was first 
conceptualized by Michael Heller’s 1998 Harvard Law Review 
article, in which he used the post-Soviet property system as an 
example to illustrate the market failure resulted from fragmented 
property rights and coordination breakdown.53 Heller discovered that 
in the post-socialist economy, property rights of real estate were 
fragmented and distributed to multiple stakeholders in Russia.54 As it 
was quite difficult to obtain permission from all the rights holders,55 
new entrepreneurs preferred to start up their businesses in kiosks, 
rather than stores.56 Therefore, the significant amount of empty and 
underused stores in the market was viewed as an example of the 
 
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 373, 397 (2002). 
 50.  See Litman, Copyright Reform, supra note 5, at 10; Lemley, Dealing with 
Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, supra note 5, at 570; see also Litman, 
Sharing and Stealing, supra note 29, at 21 (illustrating the difficulty of identifying 
rights holders for works obtained on the internet, yet simultaneously recognizing 
how the system benefits from that knowledge). 
 51.  See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1317 
(1996) [hereinafter Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules]; see also Natke, 
supra note 5, at 500 (suggesting that the practice of “holdout behavior” is one of 
the many problems created by overlapping rights which can raise the transactional 
costs for users online). 
 52.  E.g., Natke, supra note 5, at 486, 498-99, 501 (“[t]he value of posting the 
copyrighted work is simply not worth the effort or the price of all the license.”). 
 53.  See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: 
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) 
[hereinafter Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons]. 
 54.  Id. at 637-39; see also Michael A. Heller, Three Faces of Private Property, 
79 OR. L. REV. 417, 423 (2000) [hereinafter Heller, Three Faces]. 
 55.  See Heller, Tragedy of the Antcommons, supra note 53, at 639. 
 56.  Id. at 633-35. 
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tragedy of the anticommons.57 He defined anticommons as: 
[m]ultiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from 
a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When 
there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is 
prone to under use—a tragedy of the anticommons.58 
Anticommons echoes economic theory suggesting that a single 
owner is better than multiple owners in making optimal use of the 
property.59 When proposing the theory of anticommons in 1998, 
Heller was aware that this theory may have wide implications in the 
study of intellectual property (IP).60 He and Rebecca Eisenberg 
further applied this theory to biomedical research and argued that 
patenting upstream biomedical research produced anticommons 
property where “too many owners hold rights in previous discoveries 
that constitute obstacles to future research.”61 Anticommons becomes 
a tragedy when it is too costly for users to obtain all essential 
licenses.62 Nobel laureate James Buchanan and his co-author Yong J. 
Yoon similarly point out that multiple and overlapping patents may 
generate anticommons, where too many right holders can prevent the 
use of a particular resource.63 In recent years, anticommons theory 
has been applied to the analysis of a number of IP issues, such as 
joint authorship,64 patent pools, and IP clearing houses.65 Researchers 
vividly argue that the transaction costs of negotiating with multiple 
 
 57.  Id. at 633-35, 659. 
 58.  Id. at 624. 
 59.  See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. 
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 347, 354-55 (1967) (theorizing that negative 
externalities – and the traditional ‘tragedy of the commons’ – can be mitigated by 
having a single owner, because the single owner “[w]ill attempt to maximize 
[property’s] present value by taking into account alternative future time streams of 
benefits and costs”). 
 60.  See Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 53, at 626. 
 61.  Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 AM. ASS’N FOR 
ADVANCEMENT SCI. 5364, 698, 700 (1998). 
 62.  Id. at 699. 
 63.   See James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: 
Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2000). 
 64.  See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 35, at 1047-1049. 
 65.  See Reiko Aoki & Aaron Schiff, Promoting Access to Intellectual 
Property: Patent Pools, Copyright Collectives, and Clearinghouses, 38 R&D 
MGMT. 189, 194-202 (2008). 
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rights holders would eventually do harm to downstream innovation, 
market efficiency, and end users of various IP products.66 In general, 
property rights are more “a part of the problem than a part of the 
solution” in the anticommons scenario.67 
The tragedy of the anticommons takes place in the context of 
divided copyrights as well. As Heller points out, “[g]overnments can 
create too many property rights and too many decisionmakers who 
can block use.”68 When specific rights subsist in the same work are 
administered by different copyright collecting societies, the costs of 
copyright clearance will increase significantly.69 Transaction costs, 
strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases may all hinder efficient 
negotiation.70 However, this does not mean that CMOs or entities 
that obtain any of the subdivision right should be blamed for the 
tragedy. It is natural that “[a]fter initial entitlements are set, 
institutions and interests coalesce around them, with the result that 
the path to private property may be blocked and scarce resources 
may be wasted.”71 
The perverse result will be that every right holder has the 
exclusive right to prevent others from using the underlying work,72 
and eventually no single party can legally exploit the subject 
copyrighted work.73 To put it differently, gridlock in relevant 
 
 66.  Id. at 193. 
 67.  JYH-AN LEE, NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INTELLECTUAL 
COMMONS 20-21 (2012) (explaining how intellectual property rights create 
problems in the tragedy of the anticommons by quoting Lee Anne Fennel, “[t]he 
tragedy of the commons tells us why things are likely to fall apart, and the tragedy 
of the anticommons helps explain why it is often so hard to get them back 
together”). 
 68.  Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 53, at 625. 
 69.  See Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private 
Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 381 
(2005) (“[o]verlapping rights – held by different rights holders – make it more 
costly to secure a license to use a copyrighted work.”). 
 70.  See Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 53, at 625-26; see 
also Heller, Three Faces, supra note 54, at 423; Heller & Eisenberg, Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, supra note 61, at 698. 
 71.  Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 53, at 659. 
 72.  See Gervais, Collective Management, supra note 24, at 13; Natke, supra 
note 5, at 500 (conceiving of a scenario where most entities grant permission to use 
copyrighted work, but the final company could ‘hold out’ and demand an 
outrageous amount of money for the license). 
 73.  See Lemley, supra note 5, at 57-72. 
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industries and holdout behaviors would become a serious problem 
because of copyright divisibility.74 Consequently, a single piece of 
exclusive right may become less valuable,75 and the consumption of 
copyrighted works may come below the socially optimal level.76 
Copyright divisibility results in the tragedy of the anticommons, 
where overly fragmented ownership causes excessive transaction 
costs for users and consequent underuse of the subject property.77 In 
the end, the multitude of rights and right holders on the same 
copyrighted work leads to a classic example of market failure.78 
III. THE PROBLEM OF OVERLAPPING RIGHTS 
Traditionally every type of copyright use fits nicely with 
individual subdivision of copyright.79 If I make a copy of a book 
without a copyright owner’s permission, I may infringe his right of 
reproduction. If I broadcast a song via radio, this involves the right of 
broadcasting or communication to the public. Nevertheless, a single 
act may also fall into the overlapping zones of different rights and 
 
 74.  See Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 673, 698 (2003); see also Einhorn & Kurlantzick, supra note 44, 
at 418 (“[s]ince these rights are controlled by different parties and agents, the 
complexity of the system leads to a gridlock of control that may hinder 
development.”). 
 75.  See Lemley, supra note 5, at 571; see also Robert P. Merges, Of Property 
Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2659 (1994) 
(discussing valuation problems for overlapping intellectual rights on a single 
product). 
 76.  See Loren, supra note 74, at 700; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE 
CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN 
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 223 (2004) (illustrating that if it is a felony 
to use intellectual property without permission, and the owner cannot be located, 
then detriment to society will naturally follow). 
 77.  MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH 
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 37-43 
(2008) [hereinafter HELLER, GRIDLOCK ECONOMY]. 
 78.  See Loren, supra note 74, at 677 (“Without low-transaction-cost solutions 
and reasonable absolute prices for obtaining authorization for the digital activities 
of millions of users, we see a classic example of market failure.”). But see Katz, 
Copyright Collectives, supra note 8, at 402-3 (arguing that the market itself 
provides incentives for authors to avoid fragmentation of economic rights). 
 79.  See, e.g., Natke, supra note 5, at 496 (“Divisibility allows for multiple 
owners of a single copyrighted work, each with a different slice of the copyright 
bundle of rights.”). 
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violate all those rights at once.80 The distinction between different 
economic rights is sometimes unclear, which creates uncertainties for 
copyright enforcement or collective rights management (CRM).81 If a 
user gets a license to make certain use of a work, it does not mean 
that his exploitation of the work is entirely legal. If other overlapping 
rights involved are incidental to or necessary to a certain use, the 
user may still need to get additional licenses associated with those 
overlapping rights.82 
As the Internet and digital technologies have increasingly 
transformed the clear distinction between different uses and 
accompanying rights, issues concerning overlapping rights are 
increasingly common.83 Professor Jessica Litman once asked: “When 
someone views a website or listens to a song over the Internet, is she 
committing a reproduction, a distribution, a performance or display, 
 
 80.  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 61-62 (1976) (“The exclusive rights . . . can 
generally be characterized as rights of copying, recording, adaptation, and 
publishing. A single act of infringement may violate all these rights at once, as 
where a publisher reproduces, adapts, and sells copies of a person’s copyrighted 
work as part of a publishing venture.”). 
 81.  Natke, supra note 5, at 525. 
 82.  See Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 43, at 1916-17; see also 
Lemley, supra note 5, at 571 (suggesting that overlapping rights which govern the 
same conduct can “serve as a trap for unwary users” in the case of divided 
ownership rights). 
 83.  See, e.g., Katz, Rethinking the Collective Administration, supra note 14, at 
561 (“When it comes to the internet the problem of fragmentation becomes more 
complicated because a single online transmission of a work may involve different 
overlapping copyrights . . . such as reproduction, performance, distribution, etc.”); 
see also Megan Larkin, The Demise of the Copyright Act in the Digital Realm: Re-
Engineering Digital Delivery Models to Circumvent Copyright Liability after 
Aereo, 37 COLUM J.L. & ARTS 405, 408 (2014) (stating that rights of reproduction, 
derivative works, distribution, public performance, public display, and digital 
transmission often overlap online); Peter K. Yu, How Copyright Law May Affect 
Pop Music Without Our Knowing It, 83 UMKC L. REV. 363, 390-91 (2014) 
(noting that a wide variety of exclusive rights overlap in the digital environment); 
Gervais, Collective Management, supra note 24, at 10-11 (“Rights fragments . . . 
are complex and increasingly a source of frustration for users because they no 
longer map our discrete uses.”); Knobler, supra note 43, at 542-74 (questioning 
whether both reproduction and performance rights are involved by an online 
download); Natke, supra note 5, at 486 (“[t]he difficulty is that a single activity in 
cyberspace often implicates several exclusive rights and . . .  interests”); Lemley, 
supra note 5, at 568 (“[t]he pervasive overlap of exclusive rights . . . is endemic to 
[intern]et transmissions”). 
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or all of them at once?”84 She indicated that every Internet related use 
of copyrighted works involves rights of reproduction, distribution, 
public performance, and public display in the United States.85 Take 
the media-on-demand service for example; such a business model 
may be built upon all those rights, plus the right of communication to 
the public in some other jurisdictions. It is, therefore, very easy for 
unwary users to infringe copyright even if they have already obtained 
license for any of the single exclusive right.86 Some scholars have 
rightfully pointed out that the problem of overlapping rights in the 
digital space stems from the fact that the divisibility doctrine does 
not take Internet transmission into consideration.87 For instance, 
whether digital transmission falls in the scope of right of distribution 
was once an issue.88 Just like the anticommons in biomedical 
research, the spiral of overlapping rights in the hands of different 
owners may constitute obstacles to new product development and 
innovation.89 In this section, we will discuss a number of cases and 
 
 84.  Litman, Copyright Reform, supra note 5, at 45; see also Gervais, 
Collective Management, supra note 24, at 10 (“[t]he way in which right fragments 
are expressed no longer matches who does what, and for which purpose, with a 
work or object of a related right.”). 
 85.  See Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 29, at 19-20; Knobler, supra 
note 43, at 535 (similarly identifying rights of reproduction, distribution, and 
public performance in the Internet environment); Natke, supra note 5, at 486 
(claiming that “[c]onsumers who were licensed for example, to publicly display 
copyrighted content online unknowingly may be infringing a different party’s 
reproduction or distribution right over that same content”); Einhorn & Kurlantzick, 
supra note 44, at 417 (stating that ever audio transmission on the internet involves 
rights of reproduction, distribution, public performance and display); Lemley, 
supra note 5, at 567-68 (suggesting that it may be “overkill to say that sending a 
document across the Net violates the reproduction right. . . the distribution right, 
the performance and display rights”). 
 86.  See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 5, at 571; see also Natke, supra note 5, at 
498, 501 (stating that the “average cyberspace user has little knowledge that a 
particular action implicates more than one exclusive right” and also describing the 
“situation where a user obtains a license from one exclusive rights holder but is 
sued for a copyright infringement by another”). 
 87.  See Natke, supra note 5, at 495-96, 568; see also Loren, supra note 74, at 
716. 
 88.  See, e.g., David O. Carson, Making the Making Available Right Available, 
33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 135, 145, 147 (2010); see also Gervais & Maurushat, 
supra note 33, at 81. 
 89.  See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 698-99 (“[a] spiral of 
overlapping patent claims in the hands of different owners, reaching ever further 
upstream in the course of biomedical research. . .[t]he tragedy of the anticommons 
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relevant issues concerning overlapping rights in the jurisdictions of 
China, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
A. RIGHTS OF COMMUNICATION TO THE PUBLIC AND PUBLIC 
PERFORMANCE 
The problem of overlapping rights may exist in traditional use of 
copyrighted work.90 For instance, the difference between the right of 
communication to the public and the right of public performance 
once troubled the British courts. In Football Association Premier 
League v QC Leisure,91 a number of publicans used a foreign 
decoder to show on television screens the broadcast of Premier 
League games in their pubs.92 Judge Kitchin gave a provisional view 
that the publican had not communicated to the broadcasts to the 
public as there had been no further re-transmission by wire or 
otherwise.93 Therefore, Judge Kitchin held that there was no 
communication to the public.94 
However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had 
a different viewpoint, stating that transmitting the football matches 
on television screens constituted a communication to the public 
because the audience there did not have direct physical contact with 
the actors or performers of the work.95 This is because under the E.C. 
Information Directive and E.C. Copyright in the Information Society 
Directive Recital 23,96 the distinction between right of 
communication to the public and right of public performance is that 
the former does not apply to on-site performance.97 Nevertheless, 
commentators suggested that the opinion held by the CJEU has 
substantially expanded the scope of the right of communication to 
the public and blurred the line between it and the right of public 
 
refers to the more complex obstacles that arise when a user needs access to 
multiple patented inputs to create a single useful product.”). 
 90.  But see Natke, supra note 5, at 503 (claiming that “[t]here are no major 
barriers, such as high transactional costs, holdout behavior, and uncertainty over 
litigation”). 
 91.  FAPL v. QC Leisure, EWHC 1411 (2008). 
 92.  Id.; [2008] 3 C.M.L.R. 12. 
 93.  Id.; 3 C.M.L.R. 12 at [262]. 
 94.  QC Leisure, EWHC 141. 
 95.  Id.; FAPL (C-403/08)[2011] E.C.D.R. 8 at [202]-[203]. 
 96.  See Directive 2001/29, supra note 17, art. 23. 
 97.  See GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 3, at 321. 
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performance in British law.98 Judge Kitchin, who later became Lord 
Justice, believes that the CEJU’s opinion suggested that there is an 
overlap between the right of communication to the public and the 
right of public performance.99 If the overlap does exist, it means that 
the users can only make use of the copyrighted work legally with 
licenses of both right of communication to the public and right public 
performance, which may be administered by different CMOs. 
B. RIGHT OF MAKING AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC 
As traditional taxonomy of exclusive rights, such as rights of 
public performance and recitation, broadcasting, and cable 
transmission,100 only covers “push” technology,101 the “right of 
making available to the public” was incorporated into the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the European Union Copyright 
Directive (the Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain 
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 
the E.C. Copyright Information Society Directive) to include the 
Internet-enabled interactive services.102 Put differently, the right of 
making available to the public originated from the inability of the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
to cover interactive or on-demand transmission of copyrighted work 
enabled by the Internet.103 This right was designed to be a type of a 
more general right of communication to the public.104 
 
 98.  See, e.g., Mysoor, supra note 32, at 173. 
 99.  QC Leisure, EWHC 1411; 2 C.M.L.R. 16 at [63]. 
 100.  Berne Convention, 1971 Paris Text Art. 11, 11bis, and 11ter [hereinafter 
Berne Convention]. 
 101.  See, e.g., Carson, supra note 88, at 142; see Mysoor, supra note 32, at 168; 
see also BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 163 (noting that traditional 
communication to the public “presupposes an act of transmission from source to 
recipient, whereas a making available involves transmission of a work to a place 
typically, the Internet) from which it can be accessed at will”). 
 102.  See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 17, art. 8; Directive 2001/29, 
supra note 17, art. 3(1). 
 103.  See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 3, at 328; see also 
Katherine E. Beyer, Taking the “Hype” Out of Hyper-Linking: Linking Online 
Content Not Grounds for U.S. Copyright Infringement, 55 IDEA 1, 6-7 (2014); 
Carson, Making the Making Available Right Available, supra note 88, at 142. 
 104.  See TANYA APLIN & JENNIFER DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: 
TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 172 (2nd ed. 2013)); BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra 
note 3, at 158-59; GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 3, at 329; SILKE VON 
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Article 8 of the WCT provides that “authors of literary and artistic 
works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless 
means, including the making available to the public of their works in 
such a way that members of the public may access these works from 
a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”105 Articles 10 and 
14 of the WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 
similarly provide performers and producers of phonograms with the 
right of “making available to the public.”106 Under Article 3(1) of the 
E.C. Copyright Information Society Directive, Member States are to 
confer on authors the exclusive right of communicating a work to the 
public, which “includes” the making available of that work in such 
way that members of the public may access the work from a place 
that at a time individually chosen by them.107 This right covers 
various interactive uses of copyright works, including offer for 
download, streaming music works, pay-per-view TV channels, and 
file sharing over peer-to-peer networks.108 
As this right of making available to the public is different from but 
sometimes overlapping with traditional exclusive rights,109 especially 
the right of reproduction, a legitimate interactive online service 
involving overlapping rights may require multiple clearance 
transactions.110 In countries like the United States that have not 
 
LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 458 (2008). 
 105.  WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 17, art. 8. 
 106.  WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 17, arts. 10, 14. 
 107.  Directive 2001/29, supra note 17, art. 3(1). 
 108.  See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 3, at 329; see also JÖRG 
REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES ON COPYRIGHT: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE WCT, THE WPPT, AND THE BTAP 134, 139 (2nd ed. 2015); 
VON LEWINSKI, supra note 104, at 457; Carson, supra note 88, at 143-44; Lüder, 
supra note 9, at 33-36. 
 109.  See REINBOTHE & VON LEWINSKI, supra note 108, at 136; see also 
Sherwin Siy, The Increasing Relevance of Copyright Statutory Damages: Some 
Brief Digressions Upon Capitol Records v. Thomas, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1013, 1013-14 (2009) (discussing the distinction or 
overlapping of distribution right and right of making available to public); Peter K. 
Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 923, 
934-35 (2008) (noting the confusion associated with the differences between right 
of making available to public and right of distribution); 
 110.  See, e.g., Gervais & Maurushat, supra note 33, at 82; see also Lüder, supra 
note 9, at 26. There is one distinction between the right of making available to the 
public and traditional right of communication to the public: the former is granted 
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legislated the right of making available to the public, one common 
argument against such legislation is its potential overlap with the 
rights of public performance and public display.111 This section will 
use right of making available as an example to illustrate different 
judicial approaches to overlapping rights issues in China, Germany, 
and the United States. 
1. Right of Network Communication in China 
Different jurisdictions may implement the right of making 
available to the public differently in terms of the scope of right and 
its relations with other type of exclusive right. One notable example 
is China, amending its Copyright Law in 2001 and establishing a 
new category of economic right: ”the right of communication 
through the information network” in accordance with the article 8 of 
WCT and article 10 and 14 of WPPT.112  This right is occasionally 
referred to as the “Internet right”113 or “right of network 
communication” in China.114 According to the Chinese Copyright 
Law, this right is defined as “the right to communicate to the public a 
work, by wire or wireless means, in such a way that the public may 
access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by 
them.”115  In order to implement this economic right appropriately, 
the State Council in China promulgated the “Regulation on  
 
 
to authors, performers, and producers; whereas the latter is only accorded to 
authors. See generally Directive 2001/29, supra note 17, art. 3. 
 111.  See Beyer, supra note 103, at 11; see also Carson, supra note 88, at 147. 
 112.  See, e.g., QU SANQIANG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA 228 
(2012); see also GORDON GAO ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 
153-54 (2011); Qian Wang, The Right of Communication Through the Information 
Network in the People’s Republic of China, in COPYRIGHT LAW, DIGITAL 
CONTENT, AND THE INTERNET IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 187, 187 (Brian Fitzgerald et 
al., eds. 2007); Yong Wan, A Modest Proposal to Amend the Chinese Copyright 
Law: Introducing a Concept of Right of Communication to the Public, 55 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 603, 618-619 (2008). 
 113.  See, e.g., Jesse London, China’s Approaches to Intellectual Property 
Infringement on the Internet, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 7-8 (2010-2011). 
 114.  Wang, supra note 112, at 188. 
 115.  (2010年2月26日，中华人民共和国著作权法) [Copyright Law of the 
People’s Republic of China of February 26, 2010] (amended up to the Decision of 
February 26, 2010, by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
on Amending the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, Feb. 26, 2010, 
effective Apr. 1, 2010); see WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 17, art. 10(12). 
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Protection of the Right of Communication via Information 
Networks” in 2006.116 
As mentioned previously, the right of making available to the 
public occasionally overlaps conceptually with other existing 
economic rights, especially the right of reproduction.117 Some 
Chinese copyright scholars suggest that unauthorized uploading of 
copyrighted material to online platforms or servers triggers the 
infringement of both right of reproduction and right of network 
communication.118 Nonetheless, the right of network communication 
in China is defined more broadly than the right of making available 
to the public in other jurisdictions. It is a comprehensive right in 
cyberspace that includes traditional rights of reproduction, 
performance, and display.119 Two judges in Beijing responsible for 
adjudicating intellectual property cases recently published their 
opinions regarding the relationship between the right of network 
communication and the right of reproduction. Justice Liping Cao 
provides an example where a user obtains only a license of right of 
network communication, but not right of reproduction, from the 
copyright owner for a song.120 Justice Cao held that this user will not 
infringe the right of reproduction if he uses the song in his flash 
animation and uploads the flash animation to a website for public 
access.121 Justice Cao reasons that reproduction is a step towards 
fulfilling network communication or making available to the public 
via the Internet.122 In other words, reproduction is just part of 
network communication, rather than an independent economic right 
in such scenarios.123 Therefore, only a license for right of network 
 
 116.  See GUAN H. TANG, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CHINA 87 
(2011); see also Wang, supra note 113, at 188; Wan, supra note 113, at 620; Hong 
Xue, Les Fleurs du Mal: A Critique of the Legal Transplant in Chinese Internet 
Copyright Protection, 34 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 168, 170 (2007). 
 117.  See supra text accompanying note 105. 
 118.  See Wang, supra note 112, at 191; Xue, supra note 116, at 189. 
 119.  E.g., SANQIANG, supra note 112, at 132. 
 120.  Liping Cao, Dang Fuzhiquan Yu Xinxiwangluquan Xiangyu  Zai 
Hulianwang [When Right of Reproduction Meets Right of Network Communication 
in Cyberspace], ZHONGGUO ZHISHICHANQUAN WANG [CHINA INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHT NET], Vol. 108, (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://www.cnipr.com/sfsj/zjkf/201603/t20160302_195278.htm . 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
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communication is sufficient for the user. 
Justice Gang Feng, who sits on the Beijing Intellectual Property 
Court, shares a similar viewpoint that the user does not need to 
acquire a separate license for reproduction rights.124 Justice Feng 
suggests that reproduction is an inevitable premise for network 
communication.125 The former is a minor conduct, which should be 
conceptually absorbed by the latter, which is a major conduct.126 
Justice Xiangjun Kong in the Supreme People’s Court, a leading 
authority in intellectual property law, also recognized the 
overlapping issue brought by the creation of right of network 
communication.127 His opinion is similar to that of Justice Feng that 
reproduction rights will be absorbed by the right of network 
communication when they overlap with each other.128 Chinese 
copyright scholars likewise observe that the reproduction right is 
shrinking in the digital and cloud-computing context because right of 
network communication has become a major and comprehensive 
economic right therein.129 
Although the Chinese courts have not approached the overlapping 
of network communication right and reproduction right in a 
sophisticated way, leading IP practitioners have laid solid foundation 
for further academic dialogue and judicial development. From the 
discussions above, it seems that, when they overlap, the consensus of 
leading Chinese IP judges is that network communication right 
overrides reproduction right. 
2. MyVideo in Germany 
German courts once faced the issue of overlapping rights of 
reproduction and making available to the public regarding an online 
 
 124.  Gang Feng, (Qinhai Xinxiwangluquan Xingwei Gouchengyaojian Wenti 
Yanjiu) [Research on Elements of Infringing Right of Network Communication], 
ZHONGGUO BANQUAN [CHINA COPYRIGHT], Vol. 5, (Dec. 18, 2015), 
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleFullText.aspx?ArticleId=94454. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Feng, supra note 124. 
 127.  Xiangjun Kong, On Information Network Dissemination Behavior, 
PEOPLE’S JUDICIARY (2012). 
 128.  Feng, supra note 124. 
 129.  See Liping Ma, A Study on Issues Regarding Reproduction Right in the 
Cloud Environment, CHINA COPYRIGHT (2016). 
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streaming service provider MyVideo.130  MyVideo is a subsidiary of 
a leading German TV company ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG.131 
Although MyVideo already acquired a pan-European license from 
Gesellschaft für Musikalische Aufführungs- und Mechanische 
Vervielfältigungsrechte (GEMA) for making available to the 
public,132 it was still claimed for the infringement of mechanical 
reproduction rights, including the right of reproduction and right of 
distribution,133 by a CMO called Central European Licensing and 
Administration Services (CELAS),134 a joint venture of Germany’s 
GEMA and UK’s PRS for Music.135 CELAS administers mechanical 
right for online users of the Anglo-American EMI repertoire.136 After 
its negotiation with CELAS broke, MyVideo sought declaratory 
judgment against CELAS, claiming that CELAS did not have legal 
basis to claim for infringement of mechanical reproduction right.137 
Both the Munich District Court and Munich Court of Appeals ruled 
against CELAS because the courts opined that requesting a license 
 
 130.  Lucie Guibault & Stef van Gompel, Collective Management in the 
European Union, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED 
RIGHTS 135, 162 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2010). 
 131.  See Fabian Niemann, German Court Decides that the Split of Online 
Music Copyright is Invalid, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=698bb05d-7417-4b48-bf4d-
8e97bf75a1d0. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  E.g., Martin Von Albrecht & Jan Nicolaus Ullrich, Munich District Court 
Holds Pan-European Copyright Licensing Model of Joint Venture as Invalid, 1, 11 
NO. 9 E-COMMERCE L. REP. (2009); see Niemann, supra note 131; Anne Yliniva-
Hoffman, DE-Germany: MyVideo Wins Legal Dispute with CELAS Before Munich 
District Court I IRIS MERLIN (Aug. 12, 2009), http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2009/8 
/article12.en.html. 
 134.  Guibault & van Gompel, supra note 130, at 162. 
 135.  See, e.g., Benjamin Farrand, Networks of Power in Digital Copyright Law 
and Policy: Political Salience, Expertise and the Legislative Process 144 (2014); 
see also Annette Kur & Thomas Dreier, European Intellectual Property Law: Text, 
Cases and Materials 403 (2013); Allen Bargfrede & Cecily Mak, Music Law in the 
Digital Age 113, 129 (Jonathan Feist ed., 2009); Guibault & Gompel, supra note 
130, at 161; Von Albrecht & Ullrich, supra note 133; Niemann, supra note 131 
(claiming that declaring the practice of splitting online rights to be consistent with 
German law has created uncertainty and confusion to collective rights management 
schemes) . 
 136.  See Guibault & Gompel, supra note 130; see also Von Albrecht & Ullrich, 
supra note 133; Niemann, supra note 131; Yliniva-Hoffman, supra note 133. 
 137.  See Guibault & Gompel, supra note 130, at 161; Niemann, supra note 131. 
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purely for mechanical right does not make economic sense.138 In 
other words, making copyrighted work available to the public online 
necessarily involves making reproductions of that work.139 The 
courts considered the users’ perspective and therefore, reasoned that 
splitting rights of reproduction and making available online create 
significant uncertainties for online users.140 Moreover, users are not 
supposed to face “double claims regarding a uniform technical 
process.”141 These decisions were also based on the German 
copyright rule that prevents right holders from over-fragmenting 
exclusive rights.142 As a result, the courts ruled that right holders can 
only license rights that are economically feasible.143 Researchers 
indicate that the court decisions “invalidated the license system set 
up by CELAS for use of content on the Internet.”144 
3. MP3.com in the United States 
There is no “right of making available to the public” in the U.S. 
Copyright Act because Congress was advised that this right is 
already included in the combination of public performance right and 
distribution right.145 Rights of reproduction and public performance 
 
 138.  See Reto M. Hilty & Sylvie Nérisson, Collective Copyright Management, 
in HANDBOOK ON THE DIGITAL CREATIVE ECONOMY 222, 229 (Ruth Towse & 
Christian Handke eds., 2013). 
 139.  See Guibault & Gompel, supra note 130; Niemann, supra note 131; Von 
Albrecht & Ullrich, supra note 133; Yliniva-Hoffman, supra note 133. 
 140.  Guibault & Gompel, supra note 130, at 163; Von Albrecht & Ullrich, 
supra note 133. 
 141.  See Von Albrecht & Ullrich, supra note 133 (explaining that “[u]sers 
would face substantial legal uncertainty and the risk of double claims regarding a 
uniform technical process”). 
 142.  See Josef Drexl, Collective Management of Copyrights and the EU 
Principle of Free Movement of Services After the OSA Judgment—In Favour of a 
More Balanced Approach, in VARIETIES OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW AND 
REGULATION 459, 483 (Purnhagen Kai & Peter Rott eds., 2014) [hereinafter Drexl, 
Collective Management of Copyrights]; see also Von Albrecht & Ullrich, supra 
note 133; Niemann, supra note 131 (holding that the defendant, who claimed to be 
a collecting society, would need approval from the Patent Office before executing 
collective rights on half of others). 
 143.  See Drexl, Collective Management of Copyrights, supra note 142, at 483; 
Guibault & Gompel, supra note 130, at 163. 
 144.  See Guibault & Gompel, supra note 130, at 162. 
 145.  See, e.g., Von Lewinski, supra note 104, at 135; see also Carson, supra 
note 88, at 146-47. 
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are two rights that tangle in a number of new business models.146 
Therefore, digital services, that trigger the right of making available 
to the public in other jurisdictions, implicates instead rights of 
reproduction and public performance in the United States 
In the early days of the digital music revolution, MP3.com 
purchased CDs and reproduced the music to facilitate its streaming 
business model. Although the company acquired public performance 
licenses from ASCAP and BMI,147 it was held liable for willful 
infringement of the reproduction right, which was administered by 
another entity.148 MP3.com argued that the acquisition of CDs 
includes a performing right license, accompanied by an implied 
license for reproduction insofar as necessary to perform the music.149 
Professor Jessica Litman similarly argued for MP3.com by referring 
to the fact that “[m]aking temporary unlicensed copies to facilitate 
licensed broadcasts is something radio and television broadcasters 
have done as a matter of course for forty years.”150 Nonetheless, the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York disagreed 
and held that: 
“Performance” and “reproduction” are clearly and unambiguously 
separate rights under the Copyright Act of 1976. Here, the performing 
rights licenses themselves, as their name implies, explicitly authorize 
public performance only, do not purport to grant a reproduction right in 
music compositions. . . . Moreover, the performing rights societies 
themselves do not, and do not purport to have, the authority to grant such 
a right.151 
In other words, even though MP3.com had secured performance 
 
 146.  See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 5, at 574; see also FISHER, supra note 39, at 
160 (discussing whether the streaming of audio or video and delivery of 
downloadable files fall into public performance, reproduction, or distribution 
rights); Gervais, Collective Management, supra note 24, at 10 (“Right fragments 
such as ‘reproduction’ or ‘public performance’ are complex and increasingly a 
source of frustration for users.”). 
 147.  See Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 29, at 19. 
 148.  Country Rd. Music, 279 F. Supp. at 333 (holding that the defendants 
“[c]ould not escape a finding of willfulness by reliance on their erroneous views of 
a legal ‘escape hatch’ that does not exist.”). 
 149.  Id. at 327. 
 150.  Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 346-47 
(2002). 
 151.  Country Rd. Music, 279 F. Supp. at 327-28. 
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rights licenses from the performing rights societies, the court held 
that the company still infringed copyright because such licenses did 
not include right of reproduction and doctrine of implied license was 
not applied there. 
Comparison and Analysis 
Judiciaries in China, Germany, and the United States have been 
aware of the issues associated with overlapping reproduction right 
and public performance right/right of making available to the public. 
Previously mentioned Chinese judges and the German judges 
deciding the MyVideo case all agree that if users already have license 
for making available to the public, they do not need additional one 
for reproduction. They reach the same conclusion with similar 
reasoning, pointing out that reproduction is an inevitable step for 
making available to public and it does not make legal sense to 
separate them for two licenses.152 Some researchers expressed 
viewpoint similar to MyVideo courts that from an economic 
perspective, copyright holders can be justifiably “compensated for an 
ancillary, technological byproduct that potentially implicated another 
right yet had no independent economic value” and “[t]o require 
additional fees in such a situation would undermine the economic, 
utilitarian framework that underlies copyright law.”153 In a report 
concerning overlapping rights of reproduction and public 
performance in connection with music downloading and the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), the U.S Copyright Office 
likewise pointed out that: 
To the extent that such a download can be considered a public 
performance, the performance is merely a technical by-product of the 
transmission process that has no value separate from the value of the 
 
 152.  See Wang, supra note 112; see also TANG, supra note 116; APLIN & 
DAVIS, supra note 104; BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 3; GOLDSTEIN & 
HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 3; SANQIANG, supra note 112; BARGFREDE & MAK, 
supra note 135; FARRAND, supra note 135; Xue, supra note 116; Cao, supra note 
120; Von Albrecht and Ullrich, supra note 133; Yliniva-Hoffman, supra note 133; 
Guibault & Gompel, supra note 130; Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 26, 2010, 
effective April 1, 2010), art. 10 P.R.C. LAWS 1, 7. 
 153.  Jesse A. Bland, Biting the Hand That Feeds: Why the Attempt to Impose 
Additional Performance Fees on iTunes Is a Search for Dollars Without Sense, 2 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 157, 185 (2011). 
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download. . .Demanding a separate payment for the copies that are an 
inevitable by-product of that activity appears to be double-dipping and is 
not a sound equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use 
doctrine.154 
The similarity between the MyVideo and MP3.com is that 
defendants in both cases obtained licenses for making available to 
the public or public performance. However, neither was licensed for 
reproduction. The U.S. federal district court insisted on the doctrine 
of copyright divisibility and held that another license for 
reproduction was necessary.155 On the other hand, the German court 
approached this issue from an economic and technical perspective 
and ruled that additional license for reproduction is pointless.156 
Some scholars suggest that the MyVideo case presented the different 
practice of CMOs in continental-European countries and Anglo-
American jurisdictions.157 Continental-European CMOs normally 
require right holders to license both the reproduction right 
(“mechanical right”) and right of making available to the public; 
whereas Anglo-American CMOs typically only request public 
performance right.158 Therefore, courts in MyVideo found it 
unacceptable that GEMA only administered right of making 
available to the public without reproduction right. 
The U.S. judges in the MP3.com case took a different approach 
than the Chinese and German judges. This is probably because 
copyright divisibility has been clearly defined in the U.S. Copyright 
Act.159 Another possible explanation is that there is no right of 
making available to the public in U.S. copyright law, and public 
 
 154.  146-48 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 
1998 §104 (2001). .  
 155.  See supra text accompanying note 142.   
 156.  See Guibault & Gompel, supra note 130; see also KUR & DREIER, supra 
note 135; BARGFREDE & MAK, supra note 135; Niemann, supra note 131; Von 
Albrecht & Ullrich, supra note 133; Yliniva-Hoffman, supra note 133. 
 157.   Josef Drexl et al., Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law on the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Collective Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for 
Online Uses in the Internal Market Com, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. AND COMPETITION L. RESEARCH PAPER NO. 13-04 (2012) [hereinafter Drexl 
et al., Comments of the Max Planck Institute]. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  See Heller, Three Faces, supra note 54. 
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performance right is instead on point in the case.160 Public 
performance right has been coexisting with reproduction right in the 
Copyright Act and various types of copyright transactions.161 Public 
performance does not necessarily include reproduction. Therefore, 
when the two rights overlap, it is natural for the U.S. court to view 
them as two independent economic rights. By contrast, both German 
and Chinese copyright laws implement the right of making available 
to the public from WCT and WPPT, which is specifically designed 
for Internet-enabled interactive services.162 When defining the scope 
of this right, the courts only need to focus on the digital environment 
and, therefore, can easily reach the conclusion that reproduction will 
definitely take place when users make the copyrighted work 
available to the public. 
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
When an anticommons appears, it becomes challenging and slow 
for potential users to obtain permissions from each and every right 
holder.163 The enormous transaction costs for copyright clearance in a 
single use of any given work are not only bothersome for users but 
may also stifle new and innovative business models.164 Startup 
 
 160.  See Hilty & Nérisson, supra note 138. 
 161.  See, e.g., Einhorn & Kurlantzick, supra note 45, at 417, 421-22, 432-33; 
see also Keesan, supra note 44, at 355-57. See generally Cartoon Network LP v. 
CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2008)  (“[t]he definitions that 
delineate the contours of the reproduction and public performance rights vary in 
significant ways.”). 
 162.  See supra text accompanying note 4; Mysoor, supra note 32; see also 
FAPL v. QC Leisure, supra note 91; BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 3; Berne 
Convention, supra note 100; Carson, supra note 88. See generally WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, supra note 17, art. 8; WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty, supra note 17, art. 3. 
 163.  See Heller, Three Faces, supra note 54, at 424 (explaining that when too 
many users have a right to a resourse, no one has a right to exlude each other, yet, 
underuse of a resource results in multiple owners who do have the right to exclude 
others from use). 
 164.  See, e.g., Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 43, at 1917; see also 
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 700 (arguing that “[l]arge corporations with 
substantial legal departments may have considerable greater resources for 
negotiating licenses on a case-by-case basis than. . .small start-up firms”); Litman, 
Copyright Reform, supra note 5, at 20 (“[s]mall businesses that want to pay 
reasonable royalties for the opportunity to exploit work in new markets can face 
insuperable difficulties in arranging to do so.”). 
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companies may hesitate to develop innovative technologies or 
businesses if it is too costly to clear various overlapping exclusive 
rights. This section provides a detailed analysis of three policy 
proposals aiming to solve the inefficiency brought by copyright 
divisibility and fragmented exclusive rights. These proposals include 
consolidating sub-rights, implied license, and collaborations between 
CMOs. They all aim to help users get a license from a single source 
without having to track and negotiate with multiple parties for a 
single use of a copyrighted work. Nevertheless, has its strengths and 
weaknesses. This section will evaluate them by applying the 
anticommons theory when appropriate.165 
A. INTEGRATION OF RIGHTS 
Some scholars have criticized overlapping copyright as 
unnecessary and suggested that those rights should be consolidated 
from a policy perspective.166 These reform proposals contained the 
redesigning of copyrights into one single right of commercial 
 
 165.  It should also be noted that some other copyright reform proposals may 
alleviate the anticommons problem as well. These alternatives include but are not 
limited to the extended collective licensing used in Nordic countries, a centralized 
one-stop-shop licensing agent, or compulsory licensing. See Gervais & Maurushat, 
supra note 33, at 23-25; Gervais, Collective Management, supra note 24, at 17. 
Furthermore, private copyright practice has started to address the divisibility and 
resulting anticommons problem. As clearance of various rights involves enormous 
of transactional costs, some users of multimedia works would rather use the 
materials in the public domain if they have such a choice, or even create 
everything from scratch, than obtaining permission to use other people’s work. See 
Gervais & Maurushat, supra note 33, at 24. On the other hand, copyright owners 
may rely on sophisticated digital rights management (“DRM”) technology, rather 
than various CMOs, to collect royalties; see also Marco Ricolfi, Individual and 
Collective Management of Copyright in a Digital Environment, in COPYRIGHT 
LAW: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, 283, 283, 297-301 (Paul 
Torremans ed., 2007); Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 51, at 
1298 (proposing the “electronic clearinghouses,” where all copyright transactions 
can take place in one electronic marketplace). The combination of those public and 
private orderings may also help to reduce the transactional costs brought by 
copyright divisibility. 
 166.  See, e.g., Bernt Hugenholtz et al., The Recasting of Copyright and Related 
Rights for the Knowledge Economy, INST. INFO. L. 164 (2006); Lüder, supra note 
9, at 26; see also Litman, Copyright Reform, supra note 5, at 43 (“[l]imiting the 
scope of copyright to commercial exploitation would be simpler than the current 
array of five, six, seven, or eight distinct but overlapping rights.”). 
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exploitation by eliminating divisibility.167 From a comparative 
perspective, the economic rights in French copyright law are more 
integrated than most other jurisdictions.168 It provides only two types 
of economic right, reproduction right and performance right (or right 
of representation), which covers all forms of exploitation.169 Some 
others proposed to abolish divisibility in cyberspace while 
maintaining it in the real world.170 China has adopted a similar 
approach, where the right of network communication is deployed as 
a single exclusive right, which is capable of absorbing other 
exclusive rights in cyberspace.171 In that sense, any digital use of 
 
 167.  See LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 180-86  (proposing to, 
“[s]top asking whether somebody’s actions resulted in the creation of a ‘material 
object . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now know or later delveloped,’ 
and ask instead what effect those actions had on the copyright holder’s 
opportunities for commercial exploitation”); Litman, Copyright Reform, supra note 
5, at 43-45 (arguing that limiting the scope of copyright to a right to control 
commercial explotation would be simpler and align with the public’s 
understanding of copyright law’s role). 
 168.  Laёtitia Bénard et. al., France, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW: A 
PRACTICAL GLOBAL GUIDE 183, 195 (Ben Allgrove ed., 2013) (referring to article 
L 122-1 of the French Intellectual Property Code that grants authors the right of 
representation and the right of reproduction). 
 169.  See, e.g., APLIN & DAVIS, supra note 104, at 161; DANIEL C.K. CHOW & 
EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 172 (2nd ed. 2012); Bénard et. al., supra note 168. 
 170.  See Natke, supra note 5, at 505 (suggesting Congress makes copyright 
indivisible in cyberspace and divisible in real space); see also Lemley, supra note 
5, at 582-84 (proposing to create a unique right to online transmission replacing all 
other exclusive rights in the digital sphere). 
 171.  See SANQIANG, supra note 112, at 132 (stating the right of network 
dissemnination of information includes the “ [r]ights of copying, publishing, 
performing and exhibiting, etc.”); TANG, supra note 116, at 87 (defining the “right 
of communication through information network” as the “[r]ight to make available 
works, performances, or sound and video recordings to the public by wire or 
wireless means so that the public may choose a place and time to access those 
works, performances, or sound and video recordings.”); Wan, supra note 112, at 
195, 620 (noting that the right of communication pursuant to the 2001 Copyright 
Law applies only “[t]o interactive, on-demand transmission in digital networks” 
also explaining that China’s right of network communication is a single exclusive 
right because judges do not believe traditional exclusive rights should be applied to 
the Internet and no general right of communication enumerated in the Copyright 
Law of 1990 can be implemented to network communication); Xue, supra note 
116, at 169-70 (observing that the revision of the Chinese Copyright Law granted 
copyright owners the “[e]xclusive right of communication via an information 
network, as well as legal protection for technological measures and information 
management rights”); see also Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China 
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copyrighted work requires only a license of network communication 
right. By recognizing only one single right holder, these proposals 
associated with integration aim to build an indivisibility doctrine that 
can effectively reduce copyright users’ costs in identifying, 
negotiating, and transacting with the right party.172 
Evaluating Integration as a Solution 
The evolution of the U.S. Copyright Act provides an ideal 
example for investigating copyright divisibility and integration. The 
U.S. Copyright Act adhered to the indivisibility principle before 
1976, where copyright was “only a single incorporeal legal title or 
property.”173 The indivisibility principle is abrogated by § 201(d)(2) 
of the 1976 Act,174 which provides: “Any of the exclusive rights 
comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the 
rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by 
clause (1) and owned separately.”175 In evaluating the reform 
proposal on rights integration, it is necessary to reevaluate the factors 
influencing the change from indivisibility to divisibility in the 1976 
Copyright Act. 
The main purpose in establishing divisibility in copyright law is to 
enable right holders to exploit their copyrighted work in multiple 
markets.176 Before the 1976 Act, copyright owner could not assign 
any ownership interest associated only with certain type of uses.177 
They needed to either transfer the whole piece of copyright 
ownership or use contract to engage in the specified use.178 This 
 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 26, 2010, 
effective April 1, 2010), art. 10 P.R.C. LAWS 12. 
 172.  See Newman, An Exclusive License, supra note 25, at 80-81 (explaining 
one single titleholder precludes third parties from determining “[t]he current actual 
users or the natures of their various uses” by allowing third parties “[t]o pay the 
single titleholder for the needed rights.”). 
 173.  See Harry G. Henn, “Magazine Rights” – A Division of Indivisible 
Copyright, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 411, 418 (1955).   
 174.  See Newman, An Exclusive License, supra note 25, at 69. 
 175.  17 U.S.C. §201(d)(2) (2002). 
 176.  See Newman, A License Is Not A “Contract Not to Sue,” supra note 25, at 
1145 (observing that indivisibility “[g]reatly impeded the ability of copyright 
owners to engage in transactions conducive to the exploitation of  a work in 
multiple markets.”). 
 177.  See id.; see also GORMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 344. 
 178.  See Newman, A License Is Not A “Contract Not to Sue,” supra note 25, at 
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indivisibility prevented the fragmentation of copyright ownership, 
but eliminated the possibility of various copyright transactions.179 
Another reason for the 1976 reform regarding divisibility was that 
indivisibility created problems for the standing to sue for 
infringement.180 If copyright owners would like to transfer part of his 
right to a transferee, such a transaction would mostly be viewed as a 
license by the court, rather than as an assignment.181 Consequently, 
the licensee would not have standing to sue third-party infringers.182 
Even if the license were an exclusive one, he would still have 
difficulties in joining the copyright owner as a necessary party in the 
infringement litigation.183 Moreover, the indivisibility principle could 
not reflect the real copyright practice, which demanded varieties of 
contractual arrangement.184 It was also believed that CMOs with the 
expertise in one specific subdivision of right may operate more 
efficiently.
185
 Indeed the indivisibility rule has created some negative 
impact on the flexibility and efficiency of copyright transactions. 
Nonetheless, the problem of standing, which is the main concern 
in the 1976 Copyright Act, can be easily solved by slight revision of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that allows exclusive licensees 
to join the copyright owner as a necessary party in the infringement. 
Some scholars raise concerns about the introduction of the 
divisibility rule in the 1976 Copyright Act. For example, Nimmer 
suggested that divisibility might produce difficulties for copyright 
notice, i.e. whose name should appear on the published copies of the 
work.
186
 However, such concerns do not seem to have been realized 
in the last few decades, not to mention the fact that, in current 
 
1145. 
 179.  See id. 
 180.  See id. 
 181.  See, e.g., Natke, supra note 5, at 493-94 (noting before the 1976 Copyright 
Act the major problem with indivisibility “[w]as an exclusive licensee’s inability 
to join necessary parties and gain standing to sue third parties for infringement.”). 
 182.  See id. at 494. 
 183.  See id. 
 184.  See id. at 492 (noting “[a]ttorneys regularly considered copyright divisible 
in practice, feeling the ‘legal concept of an indvisible copyright is not relected in 
business dealings”). 
185.  See id. 
186.  See id. at 492 (noting “[a]ttorneys regularly considered copyright divisible 
in practice, feeling the ‘legal concept of an indvisible copyright is not relected in 
business dealings”). 
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copyright management information, marking multiple right holders 
has become easy, clear, and costless.187  Therefore, the difficulty of 
copyright notice may not be a strong reason to eliminate copyright 
divisibility. 
Implications from the Anticommons Theory 
Transaction costs are the main obstacles for market players to 
bundle the anticommons property through private ordering.188 
Bundling various economic rights by new laws, therefore, has been 
the most straightforward way to solve the anticommons problem.189  
With the integration of exclusive rights, users only need to seek for 
license from one copyright holder, instead of several. The holdout 
problem can, thus, be avoided. If policymakers decide to integrate 
the fragmented rights, they need to design mechanisms to share the 
economic gain with existing rights holders or find other ways to 
adequately compensate them.190 
However, whenever there is an anticommons problem, the 
integration of existing fragmented rights is “brutal and slow”191 
because it is difficult to deal with current rights holders and the 
existing contractual relationship. Just like rights holders who had 
“invested in reliance on the current property regime” in post-Soviet 
Russia,192 holders of any subdivision of the copyright may refuse to 
give up their rights, not to mention those who run their businesses 
primarily based on one particular right. As Heller notes, “[o]nce 
anticommons property is created, markets or governments may have 
difficulty in assembling rights into usable bundles.”193 Furthermore, 
as Nobel Laureate Douglas pointed out: “[the inefficient property 
system] existed because rulers would not antagonize powerful 
constituents by enacting efficient rules that were opposed to their 
 
187.  17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2006). 
188.  See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 700 (concluding transactional 
costs are the main concerns to reach “[e]fficient bundling of intellectual property 
rights in biomedical research.”). 
189.  See Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 53, at 626. 
190.  Id. at 655 (“[b]undlers can avoid holdouts among komunalka owners by 
sharing the economic gains of conversion . . . “). 
191.  See id. at 698; see also Heller, Three Faces, supra note 54, at 424. 
192.  See Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 53, at 641. 
193.  Id. at 659. 
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interests.”194 Property law scholarship also reminds us that “one 
should not expect existing property rights regimes to conform to a 
high standard of social efficiency” partly because legal reforms that 
abolish old ones, are likely to be influenced strongly by the relative 
influence of different interest groups.195 After initial entitlements are 
in place, institutions and interests coalesce around them, resulting in 
the possible blocking of the path to private property and wasting of 
scarce resources.196 
The same reasoning can be applied to the fragmented copyright 
anticommons. In numerous jurisdictions around the globe, incumbent 
copyright holders in the copyright market have opposed the reform 
of integrating the bundle of rights into one single right just to ensure 
their interests.197 China’s broadly defined and integrated scope of the 
right of network communication may be relevant to the country’s 
underdeveloped CMOs, all of which are state-controlled and 
affiliated with the National Copyright Association.198 It is obvious 
that those Chinese CMOs do not have sufficient incentives to oppose 
a policy of integrating various economic rights in the digital arena. 
From a policy perspective, anticommons teaches us that efficiency 
can be reached by preventing the property system from over-
fragmentation. Michael Heller invoked the anticommons theory to 
explain why the law accommodates only a restricted set of divided 
property rights.199 Other property law experts also rightfully argued 
that by limiting property rights to limited forms, the law reduces 
 
194.  DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 52 (1990). 
195.  See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 49, at 403. 
196.  See Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 53, at 659. 
197.  See, e.g., Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 43, at 1917; see also 
Natke, supra note 5, at 504 (indicating that “[a] legislative proposal to revive 
indivisibility would likely receive fierce opposition from major industry players 
with entrenched interests who are forceful lobbyists in Washington D.C.”). 
198.  See Ye Jiang, Changing Tides of Collective Licensing in China, 21 MICH. 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 729, 732-33 (2013); see also Ke Steven Wan, Internet Service 
Providers’ Vicarious Liability Versus Regulation of Copyright Infringement in 
China, 2011 U. ILL. J. L., TECH., & POL’Y 375, 390 (2011) (documenting the quasi-
government background of Chinese copyright collectives). 
199.  See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 
1163, 1176-82 (1999) (quoting Bernard Rudden, “[t]he current literature offers no 
economic explanation of the numerus clausus, but seems largely to ignore its 
existence”). 
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“information-processing costs” for those seeking to acquire the 
property.200 Given the significant costs in consolidating existing 
rights, anticommons theory provides an important implication for 
future copyright policymaking, which is that any copyright reform 
should at its best, avoid creating new exclusive rights for new 
technological use.201 Every new addition of the exclusive right or 
sub-right will complicate current property system and increase 
transaction costs associated a particular use of the subject 
copyright.202 For all these reasons, simplifying the genres of 
exclusive right and avoid crafting new type of sub-right should 
become a fundamental copyright principle. This principle echoes the 
German courts’ interpretation of copyright law in MyVideo case, 
which aimed to prevent right holders from over-fragmenting existing 
copyright.203 Without such a principle, courts have no choice but to 
stick to the divisibility doctrine and consequently require license for 
each exclusive right. This can be seen in the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 
the Perfect 10 case, where the Court held that “[n]othing in the 
Copyright Act prevents the various rights protected in section 106 
from overlapping.”204 
B. IMPLIED LICENSE 
A more modest proposal is to adopt the “implied license” 
approach to solve the fragmented copyright problem while 
maintaining the multiple exclusive rights regime.205 Implied license 
has been viewed as a mechanism to resolve the tension between 
copyright holders and users.206 By making an analogy to the concept 
of easement in property law, some researchers propose that if each 
distinct exclusive right in copyright is conveyed to separate entities, 
 
200.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the 
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 27 (2000). 
201.  Cf. David Lametti, The Concept of the Anticommons: Useful, or 
Ubiquitous and Unnecessary?, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 232, 256  (Helena R. Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds., 2013) 
(advocating that property structures should be as simple as possible). 
202.  See Newman, An Exclusive License, supra note 25, at 83. 
203.  See supra text accompanying note 142.  
204.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007). 
205.  See Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 43, at 1917. 
206.  See, e.g., Cullen Kiker, Amazon Cloud Player: The Latest Front in the 
Copyright Cold War, 17 J. TECH. L. &  POL’Y 235, 272 (2012). 
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a licensed right should also include other rights incidental to the 
subject of use.207 In other words, if licensee X only obtains the 
license of right A, but right B is incidental to the exercise of right A, 
then X should also get an implied license of right B, even though 
right B is not listed in the license agreement.208 
Implied license is not a new concept in copyright or IP law. 
Although it has not been connected to the anticommons context, 
implied license has been viewed as a policy tool to promote 
information dissemination or harness conflicting interests, especially 
in the digital environment.209 Courts occasionally use this concept to 
cope with disputes where contracts do not explicitly regulate whether 
licensees were licensed for a specific use of the work, but the parties’ 
conduct implied so.210 Courts construe the parties’ conduct to infer 
that they anticipate establishing a license.211 In such scenarios, courts 
have a wide scope of discretion to deploy implied licenses, which is 
 
207.  See Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 43, at 1917 (suggesting the 
division of exclusive copyright rights warrants “[t]he power to engage in uses 
incidental to that right, even if they implicate other exlusive rights” is analogous to 
property law). 
208.  Litman, Copyright Reform, supra note 5, at 46-47. 
209.  See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Implied Licenses: An Emerging New 
Standard in Copyright Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 
277-78, 282 (2009); 312; Jo Dale Carothers, Note: Protection of Intellectual 
Property on the World Wide Web: Is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Sufficient?, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 937, 951 (1999) [hereinafter Protection of Intellectual 
Property] (noting conflicting policy reasons for not assuming implied licenses); 
David Cook, Searching for Answer in a Digital World: How Field v. Google Could 
Affect Fair Use Analysis in the Internet Age, 11 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 77, 83 
(2007); see also Jane K. Winn, Crafting a License to Know from a Privilege to 
Access, 79 WASH L. REV. 285, 298 (2004) (noting that “[s]ome form of implied 
license for individual end users must be recognized to prevent the destruction of 
the open, public character of the Internet in the name of commerce”). 
210.  See, e.g., Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(holding a nonexclusive license was implied pursuant to a special effects 
company’s conduct where the company transferred altered footage back to the 
movie maker to incorporate into film); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 
1116 (D. Nev. 2006) (explaining case law makes clear implied licenses need not be 
manifested in writing); Afori, supra note 210, at 280; Christian H. Nadan, Open 
Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 349, 365 (2002); 
Christopher M. Newman, “What Exactly Are You Implying?”: The Elusive Nature 
of the Implied Copyright License, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 520-21 
(2014) [hereinafter Newman, What Exactly Are You Implying]. 
211.  See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 35, at 1038. 
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not subject to formal restrictions.212 
The approach adopted by German judges in the MyVideo case and 
the Chinese judges mentioned previously is, to some extent, similar 
to the “implied license” theory. Although they did not mention 
“implied license” in the decisions, the German courts in MyVideo 
held that it did not make any economic sense if users need to secure 
another license for reproduction.213 The Chinese judges’ 
interpretation of the nation’s right of network communication 
similarly excludes the necessity for users’ to obtain licenses for other 
exclusive rights on the same copyrighted work.214 Therefore, 
reproduction is a necessary step of network communication and thus 
should be “absorbed” by the latter, which is the major conduct of 
copyright use.215 In sum, we may interpret the Chinese and German 
rules as follows: in the digital environment, reproduction of 
copyrighted work is incidental to making it available to public. Users 
shall be deemed to have obtained an implied license for reproduction 
if they are licensed for public performance. Any additional request 
for license would be redundant. Such interpretation may find its 
foundation in literature, which suggests that the implied license 
doctrine can be applied to certain economic rights if it is incidental to 
the execution of an explicit license of another economic right.216 
 
212.  Id.; see also Raghu Seshadri, Bridging the Digital Divide: How the Implied 
License Doctrine Could Narrow the Copynorm-Copyright Gap, 2007 UCLA J.L. & 
TECH. 3, 5 (2007) (indicating courts’ broad reading of the implied license 
doctrine); but see Asset Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d 748, 754-55 
(9th Cir. 2009) (ruling that implied licenses are granted when “(1) a person (the 
licensee) requests the creation of a work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that 
particular work and delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor 
intends that the licensee-requestor copy and distribute his work.”); Sue Ann Mota, 
Napster: Facilitation of Sharing, or Contributory and Vicarious Copyright 
Infringement?, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 61, 69 (2001) (arguing that implied 
license “is found only in narrow circumstances” from A & M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
213.  See Niemann, supra note 131, at 5 (describing the reasoning of the court as 
two-fold: one is the technical imposibility of such a split and the second that 
“[s]plitting a composite technical process creates the risk of unjustified multiple 
claims and legal uncertainty.”). 
214.  See supra text accompanying notes 114-120. 
215.  See supra text accompanying notes 120-121. 
216.  See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken 
Landscape of Music Copyright, 92 IOWA L. REV. 835, 867 (2007); see also Kara 
Beal, Comment: The Potential Liability of Linking on the Internet: An Examination 
of Possible Legal Solutions, 1998 BYU L. REV. 703, 723 (1998) (“[t]he existence 
LEE; COPYRIGHT DIVISIBILITY AND THE ANTICOMMONS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016  3:22 PM 
154 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:1 
Different from the integration approach based on legislation, the 
“implied license” represents the approach that the judiciary is 
capable of adopting to solve the anticommons problem. Implied 
license can avoid the legislative costs of pushing through the 
bundling of various exclusive rights.217 In other words, implied 
license can be applied to solve the anticommons problem without 
abolishing copyright divisibility doctrine.218 Nonetheless, there are 
some problems underlying the implied license approach. First, 
compared to some bright-line rules, there are always some 
uncertainties regarding whether specific rights should be covered by 
implied licenses.219 Second, it would be natural for holders of 
specific rights to object to this approach if implied license is applied 
to their exclusive rights, which are the subject matter of their primary 
business and transactions. Some CMOs and rightholders have been 
relying on one single or a few types of exclusive rights. Implied 
license may thus impose negative effect on their revenues. Therefore, 
some commentators suggest that courts should consider the 
commercial reality and adopt a minimalist approach to grant the least 
amounts of rights in implied licenses.220 The minimalist approach  
 
 
of any website implies to the viewer a license to take all action that 
is incidental to viewing that site.”); Jessica Litman, Cambell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 
WASH. L. REV. 651 , 675 n. 120 (2015) (introducing the Copyright Office’s 
opinion that making ephemeral RAM (random access memory) 
copies incidental to lawful use should be covered by implied license); Robert P. 
Merges, To Waive and Waive Not: Property and Flexibility in the Digital Era, 34 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 113, 123 (2011) (discussing whether doctrine of implied 
license can be applied to copying incidental to crawling and indexing). 
217.  See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
STATUTES (1982) (suggesting how the court should tackle outdated statutes with its 
rulings); see also Ralph Oman, Intellectual Property After the Uruguay Round, 42 
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 18, 21-22 n.8 (1994) (describing the difficulty of 
changing intellectual property law). 
218.  Cf. Afori, supra note 210, at 299 (arguing that implied license may 
“[e]nable further adaptation of copyright law to the changing reality, without 
abandoning the internal considerations and underpinnings of traditional copyright 
law.”). 
219.  See, e.g., DAVID I. BAINBRIDGE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 87 (6th ed., 
2007); RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
OTHER INFORMATION ASSETS 315 (2004); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 35, at 
1039 (discussing Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 559, in which the court, though 
finding an implied liscense, failed to discuss the scope of the right further). 
220.  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 220, at 87. 
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then will in return limit implied license’s function in correcting the 
market failure associated with anticommons. 
C. COLLABORATIONS BETWEEN CMOS 
The problem related to overlapping fragmented copyrights can 
also be addressed from a downstream perspective by the 
standardization of practice and cooperation between copyright 
collecting organizations. CRM has been conceived as a solution to 
the inefficiency caused by copyright enforcement on an individual 
basis.221 CRM helps users save an enormous amount of transaction 
costs in obtaining permission from copyright owners.222  It has also 
become a practical way for authors to enforce copyright efficiently 
and be compensated appropriately.223 Although some commentators 
believe that it is the most workable solution for copyright 
enforcement amid new technologies,224 CRM does face new 
challenges in clearing rights in digital products and new business 
models with divided copyright ownership,225 such as Internet radio, 
 
221.  See, e.g., Gervais & Maurushat, supra note 33, at 15; see also Katz, 
Rethinking the Collective Administration, supra note 14, at 543 (introducing 
conventional wisdom favoring collective administration of copyright). 
222.  See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 
U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (“[i]ndividual fees for the use of individual compositions would 
presuppose an intricate schedule of fees and uses as well as a difficult and 
expensive reporting problem for the user and policing task for the copyright 
owner,” therefore, “[a] middleman with a blanket license was an obvious 
necessity.”); see also HELLER, GRIDLOCK ECONOMY, supra note 77, at 72; Aoki & 
Schiff, supra note 65, at 199; Dusollier & Colin, supra note 41, at 817-18; Merges, 
Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 51, at 1295. 
223.  See Gervais & Maurushat, supra note 33, at 16; Yafit Lev-Aretz, The 
Subtle Incentive Theory of Copyright Licensing, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1357, 1385-86 
(2005); see also Katz, Copyright Collectives, supra note 7, at 404 (citing Professor 
Jacques Robert’s work describing how CMOs enable right holders to extract 
revenues). 
224.  See Jehoram H. Cohen, The Future of Copyright Collective Societies, 23 
E.I.P.R. 134, 135 (2001); see also Lemley, supra note 5, at 571 (the divided 
ownership “[m]ay undermine the laudable efforts of groups like . . . ASCAP . . . 
and . . . CCC . . . to provide efficient market-clearing mechanism for low-value 
copyright licenses.”). 
225.  See, e.g., HELLER, GRIDLOCK ECONOMY supra note 77, at 190 (“[t]hese 
collectives did not keep up with the changing locus of value in media production. 
Today the cutting edge is multimedia assemblies, mash-ups, repackaging, 
rebundling, mix this and multi-that.”); Katz, Rethinking the Collective 
Administration, supra note 14, at 561, note 83 (“[t]raditional [performing rights 
organizations] cannot solve the problem [of anticommons] because the user would 
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webcasting, podcasting, and pay-per-download services. If CMOs 
are not able to grant the complete set of rights that users need, the 
value of their services will decrease markedly.226 
Evaluating CRM as a Solution 
CRM is organized based on the traditional divisibility of 
copyright.227 One of the most challenging tasks for CMOs and users 
in the digital age is to identify various rights associated with different 
right holders.228 If different CMOs agree that one CMO is to grant 
licenses on behalf of all other CMOs, copyright users may save a 
great deal of costs in copyright clearance.229 A streamlined licensing 
process would not only reduce transactional costs for right holders 
and users, but also foster innovative business models.230 In countries 
like the United Kingdom, different collective societies have started to 
cooperate to provide a “one-stop” shop for clearing various 
copyrights.231 From a policy perspective, governments or lawmakers 
may consider forcing CMOs to work together to solve the copyright 
anticommons problem. For example, the Copyright Board in Canada 
is empowered to legally force CMOs to work together to offer a 
single license fee.232 
 
still need to obtain licenses from the owners of the other rights, which may or may 
not be administered collectively.”). 
226.  See Lemley, supra note 5, at 571. 
227.  See Gervais, Collective Management, supra note 24, at 11; see also Mario 
Bouchard, Collective Management in Commonwealth Jurisdictions: Comparing 
Canada with Australia, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND 
RELATED RIGHTS 307, 311 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2010) (“Collective management is 
divided not only according to rights (performance/communication, reproduction) 
or subject matter (work, performance, sound recording), but also to a right holder’s 
craft (musician, singer, backup artist) and linguistic background”). 
228.  See Gervais & Maurushat, supra note 33, at 20; see also Litman, 
Copyright Reform, supra note 5, at 20 (“[a] creator or distributor seeking to exploit 
works in new media, though, faces daunting problems in identifying the 
rightsholders entitled to license its uses and negotiating the terms of the licenses.”) 
229.  See Gervais, Collective Management, supra note 24, at 12. 
230.  Lüder, supra note 9, at 19 (“Simple and efficient rights clearance not only 
enables online service providers to achieve economies and efficiencies of scale, but 
it also leads to market entry by innovators, the development of new online services 
and, most importantly, has the potential to increase the revenue stream that flows 
back to the right-holders.”). 
231.  See SIMON STOKE, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 169-70 
(2002). 
232.  See Bouchard, supra note 227, at 320. 
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In addition to the cooperation agreements between CMOs, some 
researchers propose that various rights on one single object, 
especially the public performance rights and mechanical 
reproduction rights, owned by different right holders should be 
administered by one entity and under one license.233 The Canadian 
Private Copying Collective (CPCC) was incorporated as an umbrella 
collective for the benefit of other Canadian CMOs.234 However, it 
should be noted that given the difficulty of harmonizing the interests 
of various right holders,235 the centralized umbrella model has not yet 
become a widespread success. 
Moreover, digital content or multimedia services occasionally 
include numerous copyrighted works, such as sound, photograph, 
software, or audio. If the centralized organization needs to cope not 
only with multiple rights or rights holders associated with one 
specific copyrighted work, but also different types of copyrighted 
works in one single transaction, such issues may become even more 
knotty. Traditionally, CMOs have had different marketing and 
collecting strategies for different types of copyrighted works.236 If a 
CMO needs to tackle licensing issues associated with different types 
of copyrighted works in the same transaction, it may not easily 
prioritize the interests involved and the accompanying strategies. In 
addition, not all CMOs have incentive to cooperate to facilitate 
streamlined copyright clearance. Given that the nature, duration, and 
royalty rates of different rights cannot be easily harmonized, it is 
very likely that various rights holders may challenge the neutrality of 
the centralized authorities or mechanisms. Another yet-to-be-
explored policy question is how to balance the diverse interests of 
rights holders and stakeholders of various copyrighted works.  
 
233.  Andrew Gowers, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 45 
(2006), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/6/E/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf; 
see also Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 51 
(describing Japan’s plan to establish a central clearing house to serve the 
multimedia industry). 
234.  However, CPCC only focuses on royalties associated with music works. 
See, e.g., Bouchard, supra note 227, at 314. 
235.  See e.g. Calabresi, supra note 217; see also Gervais & Maurushat, supra 
note 33. 
236.  See, e.g., Dusollier & Colin, supra note 41, at 833-34 (noting the diversity 
of markets and consumers between different forms of media neccessitates diversity 
in strategies). 
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Therefore, a centralized approach or collaboration between CMOs 
may not always be easily implemented. 
A similar but different problem is that when individual rights are 
administered by CMOs in multiple jurisdictions, the collaborations 
between CMOs become transnational. As transnational copyright 
transaction and enforcement become increasingly important, the 
reciprocal representation agreements between CMOs in different 
jurisdictions and umbrella organizations with members at the 
international level have played a vital role in global copyright 
clearance.237 In Europe, some rights clearance centers have been 
successfully set up as umbrella organizations for right holders and 
their CMOs.238 Some principal umbrella organizations, such as 
CISAC, SCARP, and IMAE, have been established to fulfill cross-
border licensing.239 
Similar to previous proposals of integrating existing exclusive 
rights and implied license, collaboration between CMOs facilitates 
one-stop transaction for users and eliminates unnecessary transaction 
costs brought by copyright divisibility and anticommons. 
Nevertheless, there is a subtle difference between this proposal and 
the other two. Collaboration between CMOs concerns how revenue 
be distributed among different CMOs.240 Although users do not need 
to negotiate and transact with different right holders for a single use 
of copyright, they still need to pay for each individual sub-right. 
Collaboration between CMOs just streamlines multiple payments for 
one single use. By contrast, under the first two proposals with regard 
to integration of rights and implied license, users just need to pay the 
price of one single economic right. Therefore, the first two proposals 
may better serve users’ interest and prevent copyright owners from 
“double dipping” under multiple licenses. 
Implications from the Anticommons Theory 
The existence of CMOs is sometimes viewed as a solution to 
copyright anticommons if they can pool relevant rights together.241 
 
237.  See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 3, at 273-74. 
238.  See, e.g., HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 166, at 176; Lüder, supra note 
9, at 27. 
239.  Lüder, supra note 9, at 42-43. 
240.  Id. at 27. 
241.  See Katz, Rethinking the Collective Administration, supra note 14, at 560-
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Collaboration between CMOs represents a market route to solve the 
tragedy of the anticommons.242 Just like kiosk merchants who wanted 
to assemble fragmented rights by transactions, while reducing the 
pressure to overcome anticommons by ex post contracting, 
collaboration between CMOs does not change the property regime 
itself.243 However, Heller indicated that the anticommons problem is 
often inevitable when the costs of collective action between market 
players are insurmountable.244 Consequently, market failure takes 
place when the transactional costs exceed the gains from 
collaboration.245 Therefore, costs of collective action between CMOs 
are the key factor for the success of their collaboration. 
The free or open source software (F/OSS) and Wikipedia 
communities both encounter the tragedy of the anticommons 
concerning copyright management. Because contributors to F/OSS or 
Wikipedia are always scattered and the number of contributions is 
huge, the transactional costs of IP clearance for those commons 
 
61 (“By pooling their rights into a single entity, such as a PRO [performance rights 
organization], copyright holders set a standard price for their rights thus 
eliminating the incentive to behave opportunistically and avoiding this 
anticommons problem. The result is that more transactions, relative to individual 
licensing, are enabled.”); see also Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, The Market 
for Intellectual Property: The Case of Complementary Oligopoly, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT 26 (Wendy J. Gordon & Richad Wat eds., 2003) 
(claiming that CMOs’ monopoly may lead to lower prices and greater output and 
solve the anticmmons in performing rights). 
242.  But see Katz, Rethinking the Collective Administration, supra note 14, at 
569 (arguing that in the context of performing rights, “[o]n many occassions the 
market can overcome these [anticommons] problems or could have overcome them 
if [performing rights organizations] did not exist”). 
243.  See Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 53, at 642-43 
(“[k]iosk merchants negotiated around the anticommons regime through ex post 
contracting. . . . The success of kiosks may have reduced pressure to overcome the 
anticommons in stores.”). 
244.  See Heller, Three Faces, supra note 54, at 424 (“Avoiding tragedy requires 
overcoming transactional costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases of 
participants, with success less likely among strangers in markets than within close-
knit communities of repeat players. Once an anticommons emerges, collecting 
rights into usable private property may prove to be brutal and slow.”). 
245.  Cf. Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 53, at 760 (claiming 
that “[t]he market route to bundling rights might fail altogether if the transactional 
costs of bundling exceed the gains from conversion, or if owners engage in 
strategic behavior such as holding out for the conversion premium.”); id, at 657 
(suggesting that “[o]wners may convert their rights into private property when they 
can overcome transactional costs and holdout problems.”). 
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projects are enormous.246 Robert P. Merges proposed to solve such 
problem by having representatives administer multiple IP rights on 
behalf of the communities by contractual arrangement.247 In reality, a 
number of commons organizations, such as the Free Software 
Foundation, Apache Software Foundation, and Wikimania 
Foundation, have aggregated scattered IP rights and alleviated the 
anticommons problem effectively.248 Akin to the role of those F/OSS 
and Wikimania foundations, if CMOs can cooperate with each other, 
they shall be able to help ease the anticommons tragedies resulting 
from copyright divisibility. Ronald H. Coase has argued that firms 
function to internalize the transaction costs stemming from imperfect 
markets and, as a result, firms increase the market’s overall 
efficiency.249 The theory can be applied in the context of commons 
organizations and CMOs as well. By internalizing the transaction 
costs of assembling fragmented copyrights, both commons 
organizations and CMOs provide solutions to the tragedy of the 
anticommons.250 
Empirical research has indicated that close-knit communities may 
develop norms and institutions to manage resources efficiently and 
avoid the tragedy of the anticommons.251 One economist also pointed 
 
246.  See Jyh-An Lee, Organizing the Unorganized: The Role of Nonprofit 
Organizations in the Commons Communities, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 275, 291-92 
(2010) [hereinafter Lee, Organizing the Unorganized] (“[t]he tragedy of the 
anticommons exists in communities such as F/OSS and Wikipedia, where 
transactional costs are extremely hard to identify and to bargain over with scattered 
IP owners.”). 
247.  See Robert P. Merges, Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the 
Products of Collective Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1187-88 (2008) 
(proposing that awarding a sort of group property right would ensure that the same 
alienability is present, and that such a right “[s]hould survive any transfer of 
ownership from a party against whom it might be asserted to another party” as it 
“[g]rows out of an explicit recognition of group efforts, and thereby renders 
irrelevant whether any single individual has expended enough effort to qualify 
personally for an estoppel defense.”). 
248.  Lee, Organizing the Unorganized, supra note 247, at 292-93. 
249.  See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 
386 (1937). 
250.  Cf. Aoki & Schiff, supra note 65, at 199 (arguing that “an IP access 
systemmay . . . create value by internalizing the externalities that lead to the 
tragedy of the anticommons”). Double check the formatting here!  
251.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES 164-66 (1991); see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 182-84 
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out that “it [is] worthwhile to cooperate with other players when the 
play is repeated, when they possess complete information about the 
other players’ past performance.”252 Communities of IP owners with 
repeat-play features have also developed “institutions to reduce 
transaction costs of bundling multiple licenses,” such as patent 
pools.253 Consequently, the holdout problem becomes less important 
in the repeat-play setting.254 Based on this line of literature, if 
different CMOs become a close-knit community of repeat players, it 
is likely that they will collaborate to fix the anticommons problem. 
CMOs are of course repeat players in enforcing specific exclusive 
rights. Nevertheless, different CMOs conventionally focus on 
different types of exclusive right and may not form a close-knit 
community. However, the distance between different CMOs has 
been eliminated by digital technologies. As a variety of content, 
including text, music, audio, and etc., has been digitalized and can 
thus be disseminated on the same platforms, the boundary between 
different exclusive rights has been blurred and the overlapping rights 
issue becomes increasingly common.255 As a result, CMOs that used 
to operate on a different subdivision of rights may be forced to 
develop into a closer community. In other words, by creating an 
environment with more overlapping rights, digital technologies may 
also push various CMOs to form a close-knit community, which will 
eventually develop a private-ordering solution to the anticommons 
problem. 
 
(1990); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 698; Carol Rose, The Comedy of the 
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 711 (1986). 
252.  NORTH, supra note 194, at 12. 
253.  See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 700; see also Merges, 
Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 51, at 1319, 1340-42. 
254.  See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 51, at 1321 
(“That is, since institutions structure an ongoing relationship, they discourage 
holdout behavior. If A holds out in period 1, B will be likely to do so in period 2. 
Knowing this, the institution is structured, and its rules administered, to reduce the 
incidence of holdout behavior. This is in everyone’s interest over the long haul.”). 
255.  See, e.g., Kevin Ryan, Communications Regulation—Ripe for Reform, 17 
COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 771, 772 (2009); see also Niva Elkin-Koren, 
Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway:  The Case 
Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 345, 371 (1995) (“The exchange of information in a digitized form 
becomes the most efficient way of sharing and communicating information.”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As Hansmann and Kraakman correctly indicate: “the most serious 
anticommons problems seem to arise when a division of rights whose 
expected value was initially positive is rendered inefficient by time 
or changed circumstances.”256 Although divisibility has provided 
flexibility for copyright owners’ utilization of their works, it also 
creates tremendous costs for users to secure licenses from multiple 
right holders. Copyrighted works are therefore underused. This 
problem has become more serious in the Internet arena as digital 
technologies enable new ways of exploiting and distributing 
copyrighted works. Such new development has led to controversy 
over how new technological use should be classified into copyright 
law’s traditional taxonomy of entitlements. 
Courts in China, Germany, and the United States have different 
approaches to overlapping reproduction right and public performance 
right/right of making available to the public. Both Chinese and 
German judges opine consider that if users already have license for 
making available to the public, they do not need additional one for 
reproduction. However, the U.S. court insisted on the doctrine of 
copyright divisibility and held that another license for reproduction 
was necessary. The difference may be the result of dissimilarities 
between CRM practices and the implementation of right of making 
available to the public in each jurisdiction. 
This Article has identified three possible solutions to the copyright 
anticommons. These proposals similarly aim to help users identify a 
single party for any and all transactions concerning use of the 
copyrighted work. They share the same goal of reducing transaction 
costs and correcting market failure resulting from divisibility 
overlapping rights. Nevertheless, they represent different approaches 
to the tragedy of the anticommons. The integration of rights needs 
legislative action, whereas implied license denotes a judicial 
treatment of the fragmented copyright.257 Different from 
consolidating various rights and implied license, the collaboration 
between CMOs exemplifies how the market responds to the 
fragmented and overlapping copyright system. Nonetheless, these 
 
256.  See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 49, at 418-19. 
257.  See Natke, supra note 5, at 504 (predicting that “[t]he Supreme Court is 
not likely to revive indivisibility in the absence of legislative action”). 
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three proposals are not mutually exclusive. It is possible for these 
solutions to work together to ease the tragedy of the anticommons. 
Based on the anticommons theory and the line of relevant research, 
this Article has argued that a guiding principle should be established 
for future copyright reform and judicial approaches to overlapping 
exclusive rights. The law should at its best avoid creating new type 
of sub-right; whereas the court ought to consider developing 
doctrines reducing users’ costs in acquiring license for a single use of 
copyrighted work. Implied license and the reasoning of Chinese and 
German judges introduced in this Article have laid solid foundation 
for future development of such doctrines. 
 
